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We are faster and more accurate at detecting frequently occurring objects than
infrequent ones, just as we are faster and more accurate at detecting objects that have
been spatially cued. Does this behavioral similarity reflect similar processes? To evaluate
this question we manipulated orientation probability and exogenous spatial cuing within
a single perceptual estimation task. Both increased target probability and spatial cuing
led to shorter response initiation times and more precise perceptual reports, but these
effects were additive. Further, target probability changed the shape of the distribution
of errors while spatial cuing did not. Different routes and independent mechanisms
could lead to changes in behavioral measures that look similar to each other and to
‘attentional’ effects.
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INTRODUCTION
Probability effects are easy to induce. When some target stimuli occur more often than others, we
react to them more quickly and report them more accurately. This probability benefit occurs in
simple detection tasks (Laberge and Tweedy, 1964; Miller and Pachella, 1973; Hon et al., 2013),
in visual-search tasks (Wolfe et al., 2007; Rich et al., 2008), and in perceptual estimation tasks
(Anderson, 2014; Jabar and Anderson, 2015). These behavioral outcomes resemble the effects of
typical ‘attentional’ exogenous spatial cuing (e.g., Posner and Cohen, 1984) where cued targets are
also reacted to more quickly and reported more accurately. As such, probability and spatial cuing
might be suspected to reflect a common ‘attentional’ locus (e.g., Hon and Tan, 2013).
While attentional cues and probability biases both result in response facilitation, there are
differences. For example, Wyart et al. (2012) and Cheadle et al. (2015) showed that they could
distinguish probability-cuing of target identity from trial-by-trial attentional cuing when using a
reverse correlation procedure. One possibly important methodological detail is that in these studies
the probability information was explicitly provided to participants, as opposed to our work where
participants are naive to the manipulation and remain so throughout the experiment (as verified
by post-experiment questionnaires; Anderson, 2014; Jabar and Anderson, 2015). It could be that
on-line, implicit probability learning leads to faster and more precise estimates of the orientation of
probable stimuli by the same mechanisms as spatial cuing (Anderson and Druker, 2013), but that
additional and distinct mechanisms contribute to behavioral benefits when information is explicitly
provided.
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On the other hand, we have previously found that the effects
of orientation and spatial probability are dissociable even when
they were both implicitly driven (Jabar and Anderson, in press),
supporting the idea that the similar performance benefits of
probability and spatial cuing may only be superficial. Examining
both effects within a single perceptual estimation task would
provide us with information as to whether or not this is the case.
If the two manipulations interact, as is the case with attentional
and memory manipulations (Liu and Becker, 2013; Haskell and
Anderson, 2016), they likely share the same mechanism. If they
create additive, independent effects, that provides support for the
idea that underlying mechanisms of orientation probability and
spatial exogenous cuing are separable.
The current study combines the designs of Anderson and
Druker (2013) and Anderson (2014). While those experiments
tested orientation probability and exogenous spatial cuing
separately, here we conjointly manipulated both in an effort to
demonstrate if there are distinct underlying mechanisms.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty participants (median age= 19 years) were recruited from
the University of Waterloo (16 females, 4 males), in exchange
for course credits. Nineteen reported themselves right-handed.
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. This
study was approved by the University’s Office of Research Ethics.
Stimuli
Gabors were used as the target stimuli. The Gabors were oriented
grayscale sine-wave gratings with a circular Gaussian mask
(Figure 1A), shown at 50% maximum contrast with an average
measured luminance of 39 cd/mm2. The Gabors had a spatial
frequency of four cycles per degree of visual angle, and were
presented on a gray background with a similar luminance of
40 cd/mm2. When viewed from a distance of 60 cm, the Gabors
subtended approximately 4◦ of visual angle both vertically and
horizontally. Gabors appeared either left or right of the black
fixation cross, with a distance of 4◦ from the center of the cross
to the center of the Gabor. Lines, used as feedback and for
participants to rotate to report their estimations, had a length
of four visual degrees and always occurred in the same location
as the Gabor for that trial. Response lines always started off
horizontal.
Gabors were equally likely to appear at each location. Only
one Gabor was presented on each trial. Collapsed across these
two locations, all orientations were equally likely. The critical
manipulation was the occurrence-rate of the probability-location
conjunctions. Half the participants saw the conjunction depicted
in Figure 1B: When a Gabor appeared on their left, its orientation
was more likely to be left-tilting, and this was reversed on the
right. Tilts were uniformly distributed across each quadrant.
High-probability orientations accounted for 80% of the trials.
The lines in Figure 1B depict the distribution observed by
the first participant. The location-orientation conjunctions were
counterbalanced across participants.
FIGURE 1 | Experiment paradigm. (A) Participants fixated onscreen for
500 ms. The left or right location was spatially cued for 60 ms, then a Gabor
appeared in one of the two locations. The (uninformative) cue and Gabor
offset following an additional 60 ms. After a delay of 500 ms, a response line
appeared for participants to make their estimations. (B) Gabor orientations
were manipulated based on location. For example, when the Gabor appeared
on the left, it was more likely (80%) to be left-tilting. This was reversed on the
right. The location-orientation conjunction was counterbalanced across
participants.
Probability distributions were maintained throughout the
experiment. For every set of 20 trials, there were eight left-tilting
Gabors on the left, eight right-tilting Gabor on the right,
etc. Participants were not informed about these probability
distributions. Practice trials had uniformly distributed
orientations. Spatial exogenous cuing was done by having a
white (72 cd/mm2) box surround the Gabor location. These
cues were uninformative (50% congruent with Gabor location,
50% incongruent), and there was always one cue on each trial.
A gamma-corrected CRT monitor that refreshed at 89 Hz was
used, and stimulus timings were programmed as numbers of
frames (mean refresh= 11.27 ms, SD= 0.07 ms).
Auditory feedback was given after each response to maintain
motivation. A high pitched sound indicated an error of less
than 12◦. A lower pitch1 indicated an error greater than 12◦.
Participants were not informed of the exact error threshold.
Procedure
Prior to the task, participants were instructed to make their
estimations of the Gabor orientations as accurately as they could.
1http://www.freesound.org/people/tombola/sounds/49219/
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They were not told that they needed to be fast. Responses were
made with a QWERTY keyboard using their dominant hand.
Participants were also instructed to fixate on the central
fixation symbol at the start of each trial. This fixation phase lasted
500 ms. A spatial cue then appeared at either the left or right
location for approximately 60 ms (five screen refreshes), after
which a Gabor appeared. The cue and the Gabor disappeared
together approximately 60 ms later (again five frames). After a
delay of 500 ms a response line appeared. Participants made their
orientation estimations by rotating this line counter-clockwise or
clockwise by pressing “Z” or “C” on the keyboard. This rotation
was at a maximum of one angular degree per frame refresh
of the monitor. Participants pressed the “X” key to confirm
their estimations. The auditory feedback was then given. There
were 40 practice trials where a white feedback line with the
actual orientation was displayed after the participant’s response.
For the main 400 trials, visual feedback was not given. The
task was separated into two blocks, with a break in-between.
A post-experiment open-ended questionnaire was given to each
participant that probed with increasing specificity whether they
had been aware of or could report the probability by location
manipulation.
Post-experiment Questionnaire
After the 400 trials and before debriefing, participants were given
a short questionnaire consisting of the following four open-ended
questions.
(1) Did anything about the experimental task stand out to you?
(2) Please describe any strategies you may have used.
(3) Did you feel that you perceived some stimuli better or
differently than others, or in certain cases? Did you notice
any change over time in your experience?
(4) Do you think that some orientations are more likely at
certain times? If yes, please elaborate.
Analysis
Analysis was done using the R statistical software package (R Core
Team, 2016). Bayesian inference testing was conducted using
the BayesFactor R package (Morey et al., 2015). Initiation time
(IT) was taken as the time from the appearance of the response
line to when the participants’ first adjusted the orientation of
response line. This measure was used because it has proven in
the past to be robust (Jabar and Anderson, 2015), and since it is
uncontaminated by the amount of movement required to report
the orientation that is a function of the angle of the stimulus. We
also analyzed vacillations, the number of times that participants
changed directions when generating their reports. Vacillations
might be linked to the confidence of the decision. Confidence
is likely post-decisional (e.g., Hilgenstock et al., 2014), and is
not tightly coupled to perceptual precision (Jabar and Anderson,
2015; Samaha et al., 2016).
Angular error was measured as the difference (in degrees)
between what was presented and what was estimated. The
possible range of angular errors occupied an axial space ranging
from −90 (anti-clockwise error) to +89◦ (clockwise error), after
which the report wraps back as an error of −90◦. We took the
median of the absolute magnitude of these errors as our primary
dependent variable (see Prinzmetal et al., 1998; Gorard, 2005).
The kurtosis of the (signed) angular error distribution was
also looked at. The kurtosis of a distribution is a function of the
fourth moment of the data (DeCarlo, 1997). Normally distributed
errors would have zero excess kurtosis. In previous studies we
have found that orientation probability affects kurtosis leading
to non-normal error distributions (see Anderson, 2014; Jabar
and Anderson, 2015). Higher probability orientations shift the
weight from the ‘shoulders’ of the distribution to the ‘tails’ and/or
the ‘peak’ of the distribution. This results in a higher computed
kurtosis (Figure 2). Changes in kurtosis therefore reflect changes
in the shape of the error distribution, with different kurtoses
suggestive of different types of perceptual errors. For example,
if an effect only works to reduce the number of small errors,
we should see the shoulders move into the peaks, while the tails
(large errors) might stay relatively intact. This should reduce both
median absolute error and increase kurtosis. However, if an effect
acts uniformly across the whole range of errors, we expect a
reduction in the median absolute angular error without a change
in the ‘shape’ (kurtosis) of the distribution.
RESULTS
Data from one participant was removed because the participant
failed to respond to most trials. For the remaining nineteen
participants, two-way repeated measure ANOVAs were
computed for median angular error, angular error kurtosis,
FIGURE 2 | Kurtosis as a description of the shape of a distribution. The
two generated error distributions have the same median absolute value
(10.8◦) while having significantly different excess kurtoses [darker
curve = 1.85; lighter (normal) curve = 0.0]. Note how the distribution with the
increased kurtosis has a higher peak, narrower shoulders, and broader tails.
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TABLE 1 | Summary of Means.
Spatial Cuing
Congruent Incongruent
Orientation
Probability
High: 80% Low: 20% High: 80% Low: 20%
Vacillations 0.093 (0.071) 0.105 (0.078) 0.088 (0.073) 0.178 (0.091)
Initiation Time (ms) 189 (116) 243 (120) 216 (127) 278 (125)
Median Angular
Error (deg)
8.02 (2.49) 8.74 (2.69) 8.63 (2.09) 9.53 (3.00)
Kurtosis 0.84 (1.25) −0.08 (0.72) 1.61 (1.96) −0.18 (1.01)
Values given are means across participants ( ± 1 SD).
mean vacillations, and median ITs. Alpha cut-offs were taken at
p= 0.05. A summary of the raw results are shown in Table 1.
Vacillations and Initiation Times
There was a significant main effect of orientation probability
on vacillations [F(1,18) = 9.73, MSE < 0.01, p = 0.006].
Lower probability led to more vacillations. There was also
a significant main effect of spatial cuing [F(1,18) = 13.19,
MSE < 0.01, p = 0.002]. Invalid spatial cues led to more
vacillations. A significant interaction effect (Figure 3) was also
noted [F(1,18) = 21.48, MSE < 0.01, p = 0.001]. Post hoc
tests suggested no effect of spatial cuing on vacillations for high
probability orientations [t(18) = 0.64, p = 0.532], but there was
one with low-probability orientations [t(18) = 4.70, p < 0.001].
Chiefly, congruently cued trials (M = 0.11) had less vacillations
than incongruent ones (M = 0.18).
FIGURE 3 | Effects on vacillations (change in the direction of motion)
as a function of spatial cuing (x-axis) and orientation probability
(blue = high-probability, red = low-probability).
FIGURE 4 | Initiation time (ms) as a function of spatial cuing (x-axis)
and orientation probability (blue = high-probability,
red = low-probability).
A significant main effect of spatial cuing on IT,
[F(1,18) = 19.62, MSE = 938, p < 0.001] a significant main
effect of orientation probability [F(1,18) = 73.48, MSE = 855,
p < 0.001], and no interaction [F(1,18) = 0.6, MSE = 578,
p = 0.433] is seen in Figure 4. There was no effect of cuing
on the size of the orientation probability effect [t(18) = 0.80,
p = 0.433]. Bayesian hypothesis testing returned a Bayes Factor
(BF) of 0.32 (±0.01%), which is moderate evidence in favor of
the null hypothesis: That the effects of spatial cuing and stimulus
probability are independent. The same trends remained even if
trials where participants vacillated in making their responses are
removed.
Median Angular Errors and Kurtosis
The trends are identical for angular errors (Figure 5B). There
was a significant main effect of spatial cuing on angular precision,
[F(1,18)= 5.2, MSE= 1.8, p= 0.035], a significant main effect of
orientation probability [F(1,18)= 4.9, MSE= 2.5, p= 0.039], and
no significant interaction [F(1,18) = 0.1, MSE = 1.5, p = 0.744].
As before, there was no effect of cuing on the size of the
orientation probability effect [t(18) = 0.33, p = 0.744], with a
corresponding BF of 0.25 (±0.02%). This is moderate evidence in
favor of the null hypothesis. In short, while both spatial cuing and
orientation probability significantly impacted ITs and perceptual
precision, these effects were additive.
For kurtosis (Figures 5A,C), there was a significant main effect
of orientation probability [F(1,18)= 19.9, MSE= 1.7, p< 0.001]
without an effect for spatial cuing [F(1,18) = 0.3, MSE = 1.6,
p = 0.260], nor a significant interaction effect [F(1,18) = 2.2,
MSE = 1.6, p = 0.155]. Trials that were spatially cued congruent
and incongruent to the Gabor location were compared separately
for each probability condition, with Bayesian testing again
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FIGURE 5 | (A) Sample distribution of signed angular errors for one participant. Left plot: Congruently cued locations. Right plot: Incongruently cued locations.
(B) Median angular error (degrees) as a function of spatial cuing (x-axis) and orientation probability. (C) Kurtosis as a function of spatial cuing (x-axis) and orientation
probability. (Blue = high-probability, red = low-probability).
revealing evidence for the null hypothesis [high-probability
BF= 0.60 (±1%); low-probability BF= 0.25 (±2%)]. In contrast,
high and low-probability trials were compared separately for both
congruent and incongruently cued trials, [congruent BF = 7.0
(±1%); incongruent BF = 15.4 (±1%)]: Strong evidence in favor
of the alternative hypothesis. These results suggest that while
orientation probability causes a change in the shape (kurtosis) of
the error distributions, spatial cueing does not. As with previous
studies, this kurtosis effect by orientation probability was not
an artifact of an uneven number of trials. Sub-sampling and
bootstrapping with matched numbers of trials found similar
effects on kurtosis.
Post-experiment Questionnaire
For the post-experiment questionnaire, no participant reported
that probability was being manipulated, even when directly asked
“Do you think that some orientations are more likely at certain
times? If yes, please elaborate.” This was the same as our previous
experiments using these probabilities for orientation estimation
tasks. Some participants volunteered that they found the task
more difficult when ‘incorrectly’ cued.
DISCUSSION
Probability and spatial cuing manipulations generally result in
similar behavioral effects: Speed and accuracy are facilitated
(Anderson and Druker, 2013; Anderson, 2014; Jabar and
Anderson, 2015, in press). As both these effects resemble what
might traditionally be labeled as ‘attentional,’ one could surmise a
common mechanism.
We manipulated both types of cues conjointly within a
single perceptual estimation task. Effects from previous reports
where either one or the other manipulation was done were
replicated. Both manipulations improved ITs and perceptual
precision. However, the manipulations act independently: There
were additive effects in both ITs and perceptual precision. If
these two manipulations share the same mechanism, one would
expect only high-probability orientations in the cued space to
benefit. Instead, the size of the orientation probability effect
was unaffected by the spatial cue. Further, spatial cuing did
not affect the shape (kurtosis) of the angular error distribution
while orientation probability did (and as has been shown
previously Anderson, 2014; Jabar and Anderson, 2015). In
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addition, a report that predated our discovery of kurtosis
effects (Anderson and Druker, 2013) had used spatial cues.
We reanalyzed those data here and found, consistent with
this report, that spatial cuing alone does not affect kurtosis.
Had the same perceptual mechanisms been invoked by both
spatial cuing and orientation probability, we would have
expected common effects on error distribution shape. Instead
our results suggest that spatial cuing and orientation probability
affect perceptual precision and speed of response via different
mechanisms.
What might these mechanisms be? We have previously
suggested (Jabar and Anderson, 2015, in press) that exposure
to orientation probability results in neural tuning, i.e., changes
in the range of orientations in which neurons respond to.
Tuning changes occur when features are cued (David et al.,
2008; Paltoglou and Neri, 2012; Çukur et al., 2013; Ling et al.,
2015). Tuning changes also occur when there is no explicit
cue. Ringach et al. (1997) and Schoups et al. (2001) showed
that when monkeys receive orientation training, the tuning
width of V1 neurons selective for the trained orientations
are ‘sharpened.’ This is consistent with the suggestion that
learnt likelihoods are reflected in the early phase of sensory
processing (Summerfield and Egner, 2009). We argue that V1
neurons selective for probable orientations are ‘sharpened’ when
exposed to orientation probability, which modulates feedforward
perceptual processing (Jabar et al., submitted).
Although V1 neural responses to the subsequent target are
also modulated by exogenous spatial cues (Wang et al., 2015),
spatial manipulations are thought to recruit a gain rather than a
tuning mechanism (e.g., Ling et al., 2009; Carrasco, 2011). Spatial
manipulations are also necessarily non-selective for features.
Unlike with orientation probability (Ringach et al., 1997) or
feature-based cues (Martinez-Trujillo and Treue, 2004) where
only the feature-relevant neurons are facilitated, spatial cues
provide no information about the features of the upcoming
target stimuli. These differences in feature-based and space-
based mechanisms could account for the independent effects of
orientation probability and spatial exogenous cuing, respectively.
Whereas orientation probability might affect precision through
selectivity tuning neurons preferring the probable orientations,
exogenous spatial cuing could be recruiting a non-selective gain
process that increases apparent contrast either by increasing the
input baseline of neural responses (Cutrone et al., 2014) or by
speeding up information accrual (Carrasco and McElree, 2001;
Carrasco et al., 2004).
If the two cue-types modulate perceptual precision through
separate perceptual mechanisms, how can we understand the
interaction on vacillations? It might be important to note
that there could be multiple processing stages (Sternberg,
1969) involved in perceptual discrimination (e.g., Sun and
Landy, 2016), and what we might be observing are additive
effects of exogenous spatial cuing and orientation probability
in the stimulus processing stage, but interactions in the
downstream response or decision-making stage. If vacillations
are indicative of the confidence associated with the decision-
making process (e.g., Petrusic and Baranski, 2009), then
they are not necessarily tied to the quality of perceptual
processing. Precision-based probability effects were seen even
across trials equated for self-reported confidence (Jabar and
Anderson, 2015). Perhaps in the congruently cued case,
participants were explicitly expecting targets in the ‘cued’
location, which reduced the impact that probability had on
their confidence? It could be that repeats in orientation are
driving confidence more than probability per se. It is important
that future studies seeking to understand the differences
between the two mechanisms not simply equate perception with
detection, since the act of decision-making involves additional
factors.
An outstanding issue is why spatial exogenous cuing affects
orientation precision while spatial probability does not (Jabar and
Anderson, in press). While they are both space-based, one critical
difference is that the presence of an explicit visual cue activates V1
neurons prior to the target occurrence (e.g., Wang et al., 2015).
Speculatively, this might cause V1 neurons to be more excitable in
the target phase. The lack of an explicit cue also places orientation
probability more closely to orientation training (e.g., Ringach
et al., 1997) than to trial-by-trial feature-based cuing, which has
been argued to recruit both gain and tuning mechanisms (Ling
et al., 2009). What the overlap is between orientation probability
and orientation cuing is an open question that perhaps could be
addressed with a similar study to the current one.
If orientation probability effects are distinct from other
attentional manipulations, should they still be called ‘attentional’?
If attention is understood as a class of effects (Anderson,
2011), then that label still applies. Where confusion arises is
when attention is understood as a general causal mechanism.
Orientation probability mechanisms are distinct from spatial
exogenous cuing mechanisms. They lead to independent effects,
and we suggest that this is due to orientation probability causing
neural tuning differences. Whether that also applies for other
attentional manipulations is an open question. It is worth
keeping in mind that effects that look behaviorally similar are
not necessarily indicative of common neural and psychological
mechanisms.
ETHICS STATEMENT
This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of the Declaration of Helsinki with written
informed consent from all subjects. The protocol was approved
by the University of Waterloo’s Office of Research Ethics.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
SJ did the experiment design, data collection, data analysis,
and the writing of this report. BA supervised the research and
contributed to the experiment design and writing of the report.
FUNDING
This work was supported by an NSERC Discovery Grant awarded
to BA.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 February 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 183
fpsyg-08-00183 February 6, 2017 Time: 12:2 # 7
Jabar and Anderson Orientation Probability versus Spatial Cuing
REFERENCES
Anderson, B. (2011). There is no such thing as attention. Front. Psychol. 2:246.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00246
Anderson, B. (2014). Probability and the changing shape of response distributions
for orientation. J. Vis. 14, 15–15. doi: 10.1167/14.13.15
Anderson, B., and Druker, M. (2013). Attention improves perceptual quality.
Psychon. Bull. Rev. 20, 120–127. doi: 10.3758/s13423-012-0323-x
Carrasco, M. (2011). Visual attention: the past 25 years. Vis. Res. 51, 1484–1525.
doi: 10.1016/j.visres.2011.04.012
Carrasco, M., Giordano, A. M., and McElree, B. (2004). Temporal performance
fields: visual and attentional factors. Vis. Res. 44, 1351–1365. doi: 10.1016/j.
visres.2003.11.026
Carrasco, M., and McElree, B. (2001). Covert attention accelerates the rate of
visual information processing. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 98, 5363–5367.
doi: 10.1073/pnas.081074098
Cheadle, S., Egner, T., Wyart, V., Wu, C., and Summerfield, C. (2015). Feature
expectation heightens visual sensitivity during fine orientation discrimination.
J. Vis. 15, 14–14. doi: 10.1167/15.14.14
Çukur, T., Nishimoto, S., Huth, A. G., and Gallant, J. L. (2013). Attention during
natural vision warps semantic representation across the human brain. Nat.
Neurosci. 16, 763–770. doi: 10.1038/nn.3381
Cutrone, E. K., Heeger, D. J., and Carrasco, M. (2014). Attention enhances contrast
appearance via increased input baseline of neural responses. J. Vis. 14, 16–16.
doi: 10.1167/14.14.16
David, S. V., Hayden, B. Y., Mazer, J. A., and Gallant, J. L. (2008). Attention to
stimulus features shifts spectral tuning of V4 neurons during natural vision.
Neuron 59, 509–521. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2008.07.001
DeCarlo, L. T. (1997). On the meaning and use of kurtosis. Psychol. Methods 2,
292–307. doi: 10.1037/1082-989X.2.3.292
Gorard, S. (2005). Revisiting a 90-year-old debate: the advantages of the mean
deviation. Br. J. Educ. Stud. 53, 417–430. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8527.2005.
00304.x
Haskell, C., and Anderson, B. (2016). Attentional effects on orientation judgements
are dependent on memory consolidation processes. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 69,
2147–2165. doi: 10.1080/17470218.2015.1105830
Hilgenstock, R., Weiss, T., and Witte, O. W. (2014). You’d better think twice:
post-decision perceptual confidence. Neuroimage 99, 323–331. doi: 10.1016/j.
neuroimage.2014.05.049
Hon, N., and Tan, C. H. (2013). Why rare targets are slow: evidence that the
target probability effect has an attentional locus. Atten. Percept. Psychophys. 75,
388–393. doi: 10.3758/s13414-013-0434-0
Hon, N., Yap, M. J., and Jabar, S. B. (2013). The trajectory of the target probability
effect. Atten. Percept. Psychophys. 75, 661–666. doi: 10.3758/s13414-013-0429-x
Jabar, S. B., and Anderson, B. (2015). Probability shapes perceptual precision:
a study in orientation estimation. J. Exp. Psychol. 41:1666. doi: 10.1037/
xhp0000121
Jabar, S. B., and Anderson, B. (in press). Not all probabilities are equivalent:
evidence from orientation versus spatial probability learning. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance.
Laberge, D., and Tweedy, J. R. (1964). Presentation probability and choice time.
J. Exp. Psychol. 68, 477–481. doi: 10.1037/h0048691
Ling, S., Jehee, J. F., and Pestilli, F. (2015). A review of the mechanisms by
which attentional feedback shapes visual selectivity. Brain Struct. Funct. 220,
1237–1250. doi: 10.1007/s00429-014-0818-5
Ling, S., Liu, T., and Carrasco, M. (2009). How spatial and feature-based attention
affect the gain and tuning of population responses. Vis. Res. 49, 1194–1204.
doi: 10.1016/j.visres.2008.05.025
Liu, T., and Becker, M. W. (2013). Serial consolidation of orientation information
into visual short-term memory. Psychol. Sci. 24, 1044–1050. doi: 10.1177/
0956797612464381
Martinez-Trujillo, J. C., and Treue, S. (2004). Feature-based attention increases
the selectivity of population responses in primate visual cortex. Curr. Biol. 14,
744–751. doi: 10.1016/j.cub.2004.04.028
Miller, J. O., and Pachella, R. G. (1973). Locus of the stimulus probability effect.
J. Exp. Psychol. 101, 227–231. doi: 10.1037/h0035214
Morey, R. D., Rouder, J. N., and Jamil, T. (2015). BayesFactor: Computation of Bayes
Factors for Common Designs. Available at: http://cran.r-project.org/package=
BayesFactor
Paltoglou, A. E., and Neri, P. (2012). Attentional control of sensory tuning in
human visual perception. J. Neurophysiol. 107, 1260–1274. doi: 10.1152/jn.
00776.2011
Petrusic, W. M., and Baranski, J. V. (2009). Probability assessment with response
times and confidence in perception and knowledge. Acta Psychol. 130, 103–114.
doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2008.10.008
Posner, M. I., and Cohen, Y. (1984). “Components of visual orienting,” in Attention
and Performance X, eds H. Bouma and D. G. Bouwhuis (Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum), 531–556.
Prinzmetal, W., Amiri, H., Allen, K., and Edwards, T. (1998). Phenomenology of
attention: I. Color, location, orientation, and spatial frequency. J. Exp. Psychol.
24, 261–282.
R Core Team (2016). R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing.
Vienna: R Foundation for Statistical Computing.
Rich, A. N., Kunar, M. A., Van Wert, M. J., Hidalgo-Sotelo, B., Horowitz, T. S., and
Wolfe, J. M. (2008). Why do we miss rare targets? Exploring the boundaries of
the low prevalence effect. J. Vis. 8, 11–17. doi: 10.1167/8.15.15
Ringach, D. L., Hawken, M. J., and Shapley, R. (1997). Dynamics of orientation
tuning in macaque primary visual cortex. Nature 387, 281–284. doi: 10.1038/
387281a0
Samaha, J., Iemi, L., and Postle, B. (2016). Prestimulus alpha-band power biases
visual discrimination confidence, but not accuracy. bioRxiv. doi: 10.1101/
089425
Schoups, A., Vogels, R., Qian, N., and Orban, G. (2001). Practising orientation
identification improves orientation coding in V1 neurons. Nature 412, 549–553.
doi: 10.1038/35087601
Sternberg, S. (1969). The discovery of processing stages: extensions of Donders’
method. Acta Psychol. 30, 276–315. doi: 10.1016/0001-6918(69)90055-9
Summerfield, C., and Egner, T. (2009). Expectation (and attention) in visual
cognition. Trends Cogn. Sci. 13, 403–409. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2009.06.003
Sun, P., and Landy, M. S. (2016). A two-stage process model of sensory
discrimination: an alternative to drift-diffusion. J. Neurosci. 36, 11259–11274.
doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1367-16.2016
Wang, F., Chen, M., Yan, Y., Zhaoping, L., and Li, W. (2015). Modulation of
neuronal responses by exogenous attention in macaque primary visual cortex.
J. Neurosci. 35, 13419–13429. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0527-15.2015
Wolfe, J. M., Horowitz, T. S., Van Wert, M. J., Kenner, N. M., Place, S. S., and
Kibbi, N. (2007). Low target prevalence is a stubborn source of errors in visual
search tasks. J. Exp. Psychol. 136, 623–638. doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.136.4.623
Wyart, V., Nobre, A. C., and Summerfield, C. (2012). Dissociable prior influences
of signal probability and relevance on visual contrast sensitivity. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 109, 3593–3598. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1120118109
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2017 Jabar and Anderson. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal
is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 February 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 183
